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Abstract 
 
In this study, we examine tax reporting in a non-GAAP setting. We focus on non-GAAP tax rates, 
which we define as the tax rates applied to non-GAAP exclusions (hereafter, exclusions). Using 
detailed hand-collected data, we find that non-GAAP tax rates are systematically lower (higher) 
when exclusions are income-increasing (income-decreasing), leading to higher after-tax non-
GAAP earnings. In addition, using GAAP effective tax rate (hereafter, GAAP ETR) and the 
statutory tax rate as proxies for the non-discretionary portion of the non-GAAP tax rate, we find 
robust evidence that managers opportunistically use non-GAAP tax rates to achieve after-tax non-
GAAP earnings targets. Finally, we document that firm-reported after-tax non-GAAP earnings are 
less persistent for future GAAP earnings, compared to non-GAAP earnings calculated using 
GAAP ETR or the statutory tax rate. The lower persistence of firm-reported non-GAAP earnings 
implies that non-GAAP tax rates are sometimes too high or too low, thus contaminating the after-
tax non-GAAP earnings with mostly transitory exclusion items.  
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1. Introduction 
 Non-GAAP earnings, also frequently referred to as “pro forma earnings,” “street earnings,” 
or “core earnings,” are GAAP earnings adjusted for items at managers’ discretion. Disclosing non-
GAAP numbers has become a common practice. Over the last decade, both the number of firms 
reporting non-GAAP numbers and the magnitude of non-GAAP exclusions have increased 
(Bentley et al. 2018; Black et al. 2017). Bentley et al. (2018) report that over the period 2003 to 
2012, the proportion of firms reporting non-GAAP metrics increased from 29% to 59%. In addition 
to firms’ reporting of non-GAAP earnings, analysts and analyst-tracking services such as I/B/E/S 
and Zacks have also focused on non-GAAP numbers (Gu and Chen 2004; Doyle et al. 2013). In 
this study, we investigate a decision many firms have to make when disclosing after-tax non-
GAAP earnings: the tax rate applied to non-GAAP adjustments (hereafter, the non-GAAP tax 
rate).1  
When both GAAP and non-GAAP earnings are on an after-tax basis, firms need to adjust 
for the tax effects of exclusions. 2  As the magnitude of exclusions is increasing over time 
(Abarbanell and Lehavy 2007; Doyle et al. 2013; Bentley et al. 2018), the tax effect of the 
exclusions becomes a non-negligible component that directly affects after-tax non-GAAP 
earnings. In this study, we ask three questions: first, what tax rates do managers apply to 
exclusions? Second, does the choice of non-GAAP tax rates reflect manager opportunism? Third, 
to the extent that the choice of non-GAAP tax rates reflects manager opportunism, does it impair 
the informativeness of the reported after-tax non-GAAP earnings? 
                                                 
1 “Non-GAAP adjustments,” “adjustments,” “non-GAAP exclusions,” and “exclusions” are used interchangeably 
throughout the paper.  
2 We focus on firms that report non-GAAP earnings on an after-tax basis. If the non-GAAP earnings is a pre-tax 
number, for example, earnings before interest and tax (EBIT) or earnings before interest, tax, depreciation, and 
amortization (EBITDA), the entire tax expense line is excluded, and thus there is no discretion in selecting a non-
GAAP tax rate. 
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We study non-GAAP tax rates for two main reasons. First, the calculation and presentation 
of the tax effect of exclusions have recently become one of the focus areas of the SEC. In 2010, 
the SEC Division of Corporation Finance issued the Compliance and Disclosure Interpretations 
(hereafter, C&DI) addressing common questions regarding the reporting of non-GAAP earnings. 
In May 2016 the SEC updated the C&DI and provided additional guidance on the use and 
disclosure of non-GAAP financial measures. Both versions specifically discuss how the tax effect 
of non-GAAP adjustments should be presented. The SEC requires that:  
“A registrant should provide income tax effects on its non-GAAP measures… 
adjustments to arrive at a non-GAAP measure should not be presented net of tax. 
Rather, income taxes should be shown as a separate adjustment and clearly 
explained.”  
Over the period of 2010 to 2017, the SEC also issued a total of 140 comment letters 
requesting firms to disclose the tax effect of exclusions and how the tax effect is calculated. Despite 
the SEC’s concern in this area, there is scant large sample evidence as to how firms report the tax 
effect. In our sample, we find that among the firms that disclose after-tax non-GAAP earnings, 42% 
do not separately present the tax effect of exclusions, i.e., exclusions are presented net of tax, or 
the tax effect is not mentioned at all. Even the firms that do disclose the tax effect of exclusions 
rarely explain how the tax effect is determined. In addition to the SEC’s recent focus on non-
GAAP tax rates, a glance at earnings conference calls also suggests that non-GAAP tax rates are 
frequently discussed and used by managers and analysts.3 
Second, the decision as to what tax rates to apply to non-GAAP adjustments reflects unique 
cost-benefit tradeoffs compared to other GAAP or non-GAAP reporting decisions. When the 
                                                 
3 For example, Microsoft Inc., in its Q3 2017 earnings call, stated that “our non-GAAP effective tax rate was 
approximately 23%.” We note that non-GAAP tax rates might have a slightly different meaning in an earnings call 
setting. In earnings calls, non-GAAP tax rates usually refer to the effective tax rates applied to pre-tax non-GAAP 
earnings, while in our study non-GAAP tax rates refer to the tax rates applied to non-GAAP exclusions.  
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market has an expectation of what items are typically excluded (Gu and Chen 2004; Doyle et al. 
2013), adding an exclusion item that was not previously excluded is likely to draw attention. 
Bentley et al. (2018) find that analysts do not always follow managers’ non-GAAP definition, and 
so adding a new exclusion may not help the firm to meet analysts’ expectations. In this case, 
adjusting the tax rates applied to existing exclusions is a less salient way to manipulate after-tax 
non-GAAP earnings. Moreover, managing the tax rates applied to exclusions does not require 
journal entries or justification with the auditor because non-GAAP numbers are not audited. 
Finally, manipulating non-GAAP tax rates will not affect the reported total or deferred tax 
expenses, so managers are less concerned about future reversals. The combination of the discretion 
that managers have in non-GAAP reporting, the complexity of tax accounting, and the seemingly 
low detection risk together create a suitable setting to study whether (and if so, the extent to which) 
managers use non-GAAP tax rates opportunistically.  
Despite the prevalence of non-GAAP exclusions, there is no clear rule as to how the tax 
effect of exclusions should be calculated. As discussed in detail in Section 2.1, the instructions to 
Rule 11-02(b) of Regulation S-X suggest that normally, firms should calculate the tax effects of 
non-GAAP adjustments using the statutory tax rate. However, a review of SEC comment letters 
related to the topic reveals that the SEC often uses the firm’s GAAP effective tax rate as the 
benchmark and asks firms for clarification when non-GAAP tax rates deviate from GAAP ETR.  
Using hand-collected data from 2004 to 2014, we first provide evidence on the tax rates 
that firms apply to non-GAAP exclusions. We find that, on average, non-GAAP tax rates are not 
significantly different from GAAP ETR. The mean quarterly year-to-date GAAP ETR is 30% in 
our sample, and the mean non-GAAP tax rate is 31%. When we focus on firms that meet or beat 
analyst earnings expectations, we find that the non-GAAP tax rate is significantly lower (higher) 
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than the GAAP ETR in the subsample of firms with income-increasing (income-decreasing) 
exclusions. This univariate result provides preliminary evidence on managerial opportunism 
because a lower (higher) non-GAAP tax rate applied on income-increasing (decreasing) exclusions 
leads to higher after-tax non-GAAP earnings (see Appendix A for a simple numerical example).  
To systematically evaluate whether managers use non-GAAP tax rates strategically to meet 
earnings targets, we separate the reported after-tax non-GAAP earnings into two components: the 
nondiscretionary component, calculated by applying the GAAP ETR or statutory tax rate to 
exclusions,4 and a discretionary component, calculated as the difference between the reported non-
GAAP earnings and the non-discretionary component. The discretionary component captures the 
effect of using a discretionary non-GAAP tax rate (i.e., a tax rate that differs from GAAP ETR or 
the statutory rate) on after-tax non-GAAP earnings. In the univariate analysis, we find that the 
discretionary component is on average positive, i.e., firms’ use of a non-GAAP tax rate that differs 
from GAAP ETR or the statutory tax rate on average increases after-tax non-GAAP earnings. The 
discretionary component is even more positive among firms that meet or beat analysts’ earnings 
forecasts. In multivariate analysis, controlling for factors that are shown to relate to firms’ 
tendency to meet or beat earnings expectations in prior studies, we continue to find that the 
discretionary component increases the likelihood of meeting or beating analyst expectations. This 
result is robust to using multiple proxies for the non-discretionary non-GAAP tax rates and using 
alternative research designs. 
According to the two C&DIs issued by the SEC in 2010 and 2016, when reporting the tax 
effect of exclusions, firms have two options. The first is to present each adjustment on a pretax 
basis and to present the tax effect in one line (hereafter, Type II disclosure). The second option is 
                                                 
4 In Section 2.1, we discuss in more detail why GAAP ETR and the statutory tax rate can be used as proxies for non-
discretionary non-GAAP tax rates.  
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to disclose the tax effect of each reconciling item parenthetically or in a footnote (hereafter, Type 
III disclosure).5 We find that the main effect carries over to firm-quarters using both Type II and 
Type III disclosure formats. We also separate the non-GAAP exclusions into recurring and non-
recurring exclusions following the classification scheme used in Black et al. (2017). Consistent 
with prior research, we find that most non-GAAP exclusions are non-recurring (e.g., Lougee and 
Marquardt 2004). In addition, we find that our main result is concentrated in the subsample where 
the majority (>50%) of exclusions are non-recurring. To the extent that the tax effects on non-
recurring exclusions are more difficult for outsiders to unwind, managers have more opportunities 
and incentives to manipulate the tax rates applied to these exclusions. 
In our final set of analysis, we investigate the extent to which the discretionary use of non-
GAAP tax rates affects the earnings persistence implications of non-GAAP earnings. When the 
non-GAAP tax rate is too high or too low, a fraction of the largely transitory exclusion items flow 
into after-tax non-GAAP earnings, making it less persistent for future earnings. We find that firm-
reported non-GAAP earnings are less persistent for one-year-ahead GAAP earnings compared to 
non-GAAP earnings calculated using GAAP ETR and the statutory rate, suggesting that the non-
GAAP tax rates that managers choose reduces the informativeness of reported non-GAAP earnings, 
and re-computing non-GAAP earnings using GAAP ETR or the statutory rate could improve one’s 
ability to forecast future earnings.   
Our study makes three primary contributions. First, to our knowledge, this is the first study 
to investigate the tax rates firms apply to non-GAAP exclusions and whether such rates reflect 
managerial opportunism. The SEC C&DIs require companies to disclose the tax effects of 
exclusions (using either of two proposed approaches, which we discuss in Section 2.1) and to 
                                                 
5 See Section 2.1 for a detailed discussion on Type II and Type III disclosure formats. 
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discuss how they calculate the tax effect. Despite the SEC’s concern about firms not fully 
disclosing the tax effect of non-GAAP exclusions, there is a dearth of empirical evidence as to 
how firms comply with the guidance. We find that a nontrivial percentage of firms do not disclose 
the tax effect of non-GAAP adjustments. Among firms that do disclose the tax effect of exclusions, 
hardly any of them discuss how the tax effect is calculated. Given the complexity of accounting 
for income taxes and the amount of discretion that managers have in non-GAAP reporting, our 
study sheds light on whether regulators should mandate more detailed, standardized disclosure on 
the tax effect of non-GAAP exclusions.  
Second, our study extends the literature on earnings management through tax and related 
accounts to a non-GAAP reporting setting. Various studies examine the opportunistic reporting of 
income tax expenses (Dhaliwal, Gleason, and Mills 2004; Schrand and Wong 2003; Krull 2004). 
However, the extant literature on accounting for income taxes is primarily focused on the balance 
sheet and income statement reporting of taxes (Graham, Raedy, and Shackelford 2012). Despite 
non-GAAP tax rates being used prevalently in earnings releases and earnings conference calls, 
non-GAAP tax rates and managerial incentives behind their use has received little attention from 
researchers. We argue that managing the non-GAAP tax rate could be an alternative 
earnings/perception management tool without many real consequences (e.g., no cash flow 
consequence and no accrual reversal) and with a low detection risk (e.g., it does not require firms 
to create a “new” exclusion item). Our results are consistent with managers indeed managing non-
GAAP tax rates to meet earnings targets.    
 Finally, our study has implications for users of non-GAAP numbers, including investors, 
analysts, and regulators. When the non-GAAP tax rate deviates from GAAP ETR or the statutory 
rate, and when such deviation increases after-tax non-GAAP earnings, it raises a red flag about 
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managerial opportunism and the informativeness of the reported after-tax non-GAAP numbers. 
Given that tax effects take up about one-third of pretax numbers, users of non-GAAP numbers 
should pay closer attention to how non-GAAP tax rates are determined. Our earnings persistence 
test also suggests that re-computing non-GAAP earnings using GAAP ETR or the statutory rate 
can improve one’s ability to forecast one-year-ahead GAAP earnings. 
 Our study is related to but differs from two contemporaneous studies. Donelson et al. (2017) 
examine whether analysts understand the earnings persistence implications of nonrecurring tax 
items. Our study is similar in that we both examine taxes in the non-GAAP reporting setting. 
However, our study focuses on the tax rate(s) that firms apply on all types of exclusion items, 
while Donelson et al. (2017) focus on the exclusion of nonrecurring tax items. Kaplan et al. (2018) 
examine whether firms reporting discontinued operations engage in classification shifting by 
moving tax expense (benefit) out of (into) continuing operations so that they can report higher 
after-tax earnings from continuing operations. Although our study and Kaplan et al. (2018) both 
look at tax rates applied to non-core items, we focus on the non-GAAP reporting setting while 
Kaplan et al. (2018) focus on classification shifting within the income statement.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we review the 
related literature and develop our hypotheses. Section 3 presents the research design. Section 4 
presents the sample construction process and the empirical results. Section 5 concludes.  
2. Background, Related Literature, and Hypothesis Development 
2.1 Background  
When non-GAAP earnings are presented on an after-tax basis, firms should adjust the 
exclusion items for their tax effects. Two issues arise here. First, how should firms present the tax 
effect of non-GAAP exclusions? Second, how should firms determine the tax effect?  
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For the first issue, before 2010, there were no strict guidelines on how the tax effects of 
non-GAAP exclusions should be presented. Often times, firms presented each exclusion item net 
of tax and did not separately disclose the tax effect associated with the exclusions. On January 11, 
2010, the Division of Corporation Finance of the SEC published its Compliance and Disclosure 
Interpretations (C&DI) relating to non-GAAP financial measures, which provides guidance on 
how firms should present the tax effects of exclusions.6 According to the C&DI, firms have two 
options when reporting the tax effect of exclusions. The first is to present the pretax or after-tax 
amount of each adjustment and to disclose the tax effect of each adjustment item parenthetically 
or in a footnote to the reconciliation. The other option is to present the tax effect in one line in the 
GAAP to non-GAAP reconciliation. In either case, firms should disclose how they calculated the 
tax effect. We provide examples of both types of disclosures in Appendix B. 
 What tax rates should firms use to compute the tax effect of non-GAAP adjustments? The 
SEC’s C&DIs are silent on this issue. To our knowledge, the only guidance that prescribes how 
the tax effect of non-GAAP adjustment should be calculated is in the instructions to Rule 11-02(b) 
of Regulation S-X. According to Instruction (7):  
“Tax effects, if any, of pro forma adjustments normally should be calculated at the 
statutory rate in effect during the periods for which pro forma condensed income 
statements are presented and should be reflected as a separate pro forma 
adjustment.”7  
Based on our review of SEC comment letters, we find that sometimes the SEC staff asks 
firms to explain why their non-GAAP rate differs from GAAP ETR, implying that GAAP ETR 
could also be the starting point when a firm decides what non-GAAP tax rate to use.8 In our 
                                                 
6 See: http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/guidance/nongaapinterp.htm  
7 https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/17/210.11-02 
8 For example, in a comment letter issued to TIBCO Software Inc., the SEC staff wrote, “we note that you use a 28% 
tax rate, which differs from your GAAP tax rate. Please explain to us why you believe this non-GAAP tax rate is more 
appropriate and explain to us how this rate differs from your GAAP tax rate.”  
(https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1085280/000000000006028191/0000000000-06-028191-index.htm)  
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subsequent analysis, where we need to compute the discretionary portion of the non-GAAP tax 
rate, we use both GAAP ETR and the statutory tax rate as a proxy for the non-discretionary portion.  
Although conceptually the non-GAAP tax rate should approximate to GAAP ETR or the 
statutory tax rate, it could differ from the two tax rates for two main reasons. First, it is possible 
that managers strategically choose a higher or lower non-GAAP tax rate in order to arrive at their 
desired after-tax non-GAAP earnings. We formally examine this possibility in the subsequent 
analysis. Second, the exclusion may represent a permanent book-tax difference item. In this case, 
the exclusion is either nontaxable or nondeductible, and the tax rate applied to it should be zero.9 
For example, stock-based compensation expense is frequently excluded from non-GAAP earnings, 
especially after SFAS 123R (Barth et al. 2012). The compensation expense related to incentive 
stock options (ISOs) is nondeductible for tax purposes. Therefore, when companies exclude stock 
compensation expenses associated with ISOs, they do not need to adjust for tax effects. In Section 
4.4.2 we discuss the implications of non-GAAP exclusions that reflect permanent book-tax 
differences and conduct robustness tests to make sure that our inferences are not affected by the 
presence of such exclusion items.  
2.2 Related literature 
Our study is related to several streams of literature. The first link is to the literature on non-
GAAP reporting. On the one hand, managers disclose non-GAAP earnings that purge the effect of 
                                                 
    In another comment letter, issued to Celanese Corporation on September 26, 2016, the SEC commented: “we note 
your GAAP effective tax rate for the years ended 2015, 2014 and 2013 was 41%, 33% and 32%, respectively, and 
your non-GAAP effective tax rate for those years was 18%, 21% and 19%, respectively. Please explain to us how you 
calculate the income tax effects of your non-GAAP adjustments.”  
(https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1306830/000000000016094590/filename1.pdf)  
9 Note that if the excluded item represents a temporary book-tax difference, the non-GAAP tax rate should still 
approximate the GAAP ETR or the statutory rate. The reason is that the tax effect of an exclusion item should 
include both current and deferred tax expense. See Question 102.11 of 
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/guidance/nongaapinterp.htm   
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transitory items, so as to communicate their firms’ fundamental performance. Bradshaw and Sloan 
(2002) and Bhattacharya et al. (2003) report that non-GAAP earnings are on average more value-
relevant than GAAP earnings, implying that non-GAAP earnings provide information that is useful 
for the pricing of firms’ fundamentals. Lougee and Marquardt (2004) show that firms provide non-
GAAP numbers when the informativeness of their GAAP earnings numbers is low. On the other 
hand, prior studies also report that non-GAAP exclusions reflect managerial opportunism as 
exclusions are used to meet earnings targets (Doyle et al. 2003; Doyle et al. 2013; Abarbanell and 
Lehavy 2007). Because we are primarily interested in firms’ noncompliance with regard to the tax 
adjustments of exclusion items, our argument below is more closely related to the managerial 
opportunism view. However, we acknowledge that the two views are not mutually exclusive.  
The second link is to the literature that studies how tax rates and tax-related accounts are 
used to manipulate bottom-line earnings in order to beat earnings benchmarks. Dhaliwal et al. 
(2004) show that managers use their discretion over accrued tax expenses to meet or beat analysts’ 
forecasts. In particular, managers lower their expected GAAP ETR in the fourth quarter to meet 
or beat analysts’ consensus forecasts that otherwise would have been missed. Schrand and Wong 
(2003) report that firms lower their valuation allowances to meet or beat analysts’ forecasts. In 
addition to the valuation allowance, prior studies show that other tax accounts such as the tax 
contingency reserve and permanently reinvested earnings are also used to meet or beat the analysts’ 
forecasts (Gupta, Laux, and Lynch 2016; Krull 2004). The studies mentioned above investigate 
managerial discretion over taxes in a GAAP setting, i.e., journal entries are required, numbers are 
audited, and future reversal is expected. Managerial discretion over taxes in the non-GAAP 
reporting setting has so far received very little attention.   
2.3 Hypotheses 
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We argue that managers have opportunities and incentives to manage non-GAAP tax rates 
for three reasons. First, prior studies find that the market partially understands the opportunistic 
nature of pro forma exclusions and discounts positive earnings surprises that are accompanied by 
exclusions (Doyle et al. 2013; Black et al. 2017). Gu and Chen (2004) argue that the existence of 
many exclusions are anticipated before the earnings announcement. This point is confirmed by 
Doyle et al. (2013):  
“For many firms, the existence of upcoming unusual items is publicly known well 
before the earnings announcement. Often, a firm will issue a press release 
indicating the types of unusual items but not the actual amounts.”  
Therefore, when the market has an expectation of items that are typically excluded (e.g., 
stock-based compensation expenses or restructuring charges), adding a new exclusion item is 
likely to draw attention and to be discounted by the market. In this case, instead of adding a new 
exclusion, managers could adjust the tax rates applied to the existing exclusions to affect the after-
tax non-GAAP earnings. Second, manipulating the tax rates applied to exclusions does not require 
journal entries or extensive justification with the auditor because non-GAAP numbers are not 
audited. Third, manipulating non-GAAP tax rates will not affect the reported total or deferred tax 
expenses. Therefore, managers can influence the market’s perception of their firms’ core earnings 
without worrying about future reversals. In light of this, observing what tax rates managers apply 
to the existing exclusions will be a powerful setting in which to detect any opportunistic behavior. 
When expenses are excluded from non-GAAP earnings, any accrued tax benefits 
associated with these expenses should also be excluded. Excluding expenses is income-increasing, 
but excluding tax benefits has the opposite effect. Therefore, managers have incentives to use a 
lower non-GAAP tax rate so that they can report higher after-tax non-GAAP earnings. On the 
other hand, when gains are excluded from non-GAAP earnings, i.e., non-GAAP adjustments are 
income-decreasing, managers may use their discretion and apply a higher non-GAAP tax rate. 
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These effects are likely to be stronger if such discretion allows managers to report a non-GAAP 
number that meets or beats analysts’ consensus forecasts. This leads to our first hypothesis:  
H1: The discretionary use of non-GAAP tax rates is associated with a higher likelihood of 
meeting or beating analysts’ earnings forecasts.  
Our hypothesis relies on a fairly mild assumption that the market is slow to unwind the 
actual tax effect of exclusions. With a nonzero percentage of inattentive market participants, we 
expect that on average managers have incentives to manipulate non-GAAP tax rates in order to 
influence market perceptions (Hirshleifer and Teoh 2003). Given the ample evidence of investor 
and analyst inattention and the complex nature of the tax account, we believe our assumption is 
reasonable. If market participants are able to filter out manager opportunism, we might not find 
the results predicted in H1.  
When managers choose non-GAAP tax rates strategically, the tax rate could be too low 
(high) when non-GAAP adjustments are income-increasing (income-decreasing). For income-
increasing adjustments, when the tax rate is too low, the reported after-tax non-GAAP earnings 
include a fraction of the (largely transient) adjustments. Similar logic applies to income-decreasing 
adjustments.10  Prior studies show that exclusion items are on average nonrecurring and less 
persistent, so the discretionary use of non-GAAP tax rates likely contaminates the reported non-
GAAP earnings with nonrecurring exclusions, making it less persistent. Our second hypothesis is 
stated as follows: 
H2: The discretionary use of non-GAAP tax rates is associated with less persistent non-
GAAP earnings.  
                                                 
10 For example, a firm excludes an inventory write-down of $100 and the GAAP ETR is 35 percent. If the manager 
strategically applies a 20% non-GAAP tax rate on the $100 exclusion, there is a $15 (100 × 35%  100 × 20%) 
inventory write-down included in the non-GAAP earnings. 
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3. Research Design 
To test H1, for each firm-quarter, we first identify the non-discretionary portion of the non-
GAAP tax rate. As described in Section 2.1, ex ante, we believe that firms either use the statutory 
rate or GAAP ETR as the starting point when choosing non-GAAP tax rates. Ex post, we find that 
20% (21%) of firm-quarters use a non-GAAP tax rate that is within a  2% range of their GAAP 
ETR (statutory rate). This clustering around the GAAP ETR and/or statutory rate suggests that 
many firms do use the two tax rates as a benchmark when determining their non-GAAP tax rates. 
Hence, for each firm-quarter, we use the year-to-date GAAP ETR and the statutory tax rate as a 
proxy for the non-discretionary portion of non-GAAP tax rates.11 
Using GAAP ETR and the statutory rate to proxy for the non-discretionary portion of non-
GAAP tax rates, we calculate the non-discretionary portion of non-GAAP earnings as follows:  
NG_EARNETR = EARN + pretax exclusions × (1 – GAAP ETR) - NonRecurTax 
NG_EARNSTR = EARN + pretax exclusions × (1 – STR) - NonRecurTax 
where EARN represents after-tax GAAP earnings, NG_EARNETR is the non-discretionary 
non-GAAP earnings calculated by applying GAAP ETR to pretax exclusions, and NG_EARNSTR 
is the non-discretionary non-GAAP earnings calculated by applying the statutory tax rate to pretax 
non-GAAP exclusions. Both versions of non-GAAP earnings are adjusted by nonrecurring tax 
items (NonRecurTax), i.e., one-time discrete tax items that directly flow into the tax expense line 
in the GAAP to non-GAAP reconciliation. Next, the effect of the discretionary non-GAAP tax 
rate on non-GAAP earnings can be expressed as:   
∆NG_EARNETR = NG_EARN – NG_EARNETR  
∆NG_EARNSTR = NG_EARN – NG_EARNSTR  
                                                 
11 We use year-to-date GAAP ETR because quarterly ETR is more likely to be contaminated by one-time discrete tax 
items (see Bratten et al. 2017). We find qualitatively similar results using quarterly GAAP ETR or annual GAAP ETR. 
See Section 4.6: Robustness Checks. 
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where NG_EARN is the reported after-tax non-GAAP earnings, calculated as: NG_EARN 
= EARN + pretax exclusions – total tax effect – NonRecurTax where EARN represents after-tax 
GAAP earnings and total tax effect is the firm-disclosed tax effect on exclusions. 
∆NG_EARNETR and ∆NG_EARNSTR are our key variables of interest. A positive 
∆NG_EARNETR (∆NG_EARNSTR) suggests that the actual non-GAAP tax rate the firm uses 
increases non-GAAP income relative to the case where non-GAAP income is calculated using the 
GAAP ETR (statutory tax rate). ∆NG_EARNETR (∆NG_EARNSTR) is a function of both the 
discretionary non-GAAP tax rate and the magnitude of total non-GAAP adjustments. When non-
GAAP adjustments are income-increasing (i.e., expenses are excluded), applying an abnormally 
low tax rate on adjustments increases the reported after-tax non-GAAP earnings, and vice versa 
(see Appendix A for a numerical example).  
We adopt the following model from Doyle et al. (2013) to test H1: 
MBEit = 0 + 1∆NG_EARNETR it + 2Total_ADJit + Controls + Year FE + Qtr FE + it (1a) 
MBEit = 0 + 1∆NG_EARNSTR it + 2Total_ADJit + Controls + Year FE + Qtr FE + it (1b) 
 
In Equations (1a) and (1b), we use a probit model to estimate whether the discretionary use 
of non-GAAP tax rates (∆NG_EARNETR or ∆NG_EARNSTR) is related to the likelihood of meeting 
or beating analysts’ forecasts. MBE is a binary variable that equals one when the firm’s reported 
non-GAAP earnings meet or beat the consensus analyst forecast in quarter t, and zero otherwise. 
A positive β1 is consistent with H1 that the discretionary use of non-GAAP tax rates increases the 
firm’s chance to meet or beat analyst consensus. We also control for the amount of total pretax 
exclusions (Total_ADJ) so that the coefficient on ∆NG_EARNETR (∆NG_EARNSTR) captures only 
the discretionary tax rate effect. We expect β2 to be positive. In addition, we include a set of 
controls that prior studies have shown to be correlated with a firm’s tendency to meet or beat 
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analysts’ forecasts. These variables include book-to-market ratio, sales growth, size, and return on 
assets (Doyle et al. 2013).12 
To test whether the discretionary use of non-GAAP tax rates contaminates the reported 
after-tax non-GAAP earnings, making it less persistent (H2), we estimate the following equations: 
EARNit+4 = 0 + 1NG_EARNit + it+4 (2a) 
EARNit+4 = 0 + γ1NG_EARNETRit + γ2∆NG_EARNETR it + it+4 (2b) 
EARNit+4 = 0 + γ1NG_EARNSTRit + γ2∆NG_EARNSTR it + it+4 (2c) 
 
where EARNt+4 is the same quarter one-year-ahead GAAP earnings for firm i in quarter t. 
Here we are primarily interested in earnings persistence with respect to future GAAP earnings 
(rather than future non-GAAP earnings), because if managers persistently use non-GAAP tax rates 
strategically, they will be able to report a series of self-predictable non-GAAP earnings. In 
Equation (2a), NG_EARNit is the current quarter’s reported non-GAAP earnings. To the extent that 
non-GAAP earnings capture persistent “core” earnings, 1 should be positive. In Equations (2b) 
and (2c), we separate NG_EARN into a non-discretionary component, NG_EARNETR 
(NG_EARNSTR), and a discretionary component, ∆NG_EARNETR (∆NG_EARNSTR). The 
discretionary component, ∆NG_EARNETR (∆NG_EARNSTR), measures the effect of using a 
discretionary non-GAAP tax rate on non-GAAP earnings. H2 predicts that, by applying a 
discretionary non-GAAP tax rate on exclusions, managers include a fraction of the largely 
transitory non-GAAP adjustments in the reported after-tax GAAP earnings. Hence, the reported 
non-GAAP earnings should be less persistent than non-GAAP earnings computed using a 
nondiscretionary non-GAAP tax rate, i.e., 1 < γ1. In addition, we expect Eq. (2a) to have lower 
explanatory power relative to Eq. (2b) and (2c).  
                                                 
12 Doyle et al. (2013) also include an indicator variable coded one if the firm is profitable. However, we note that 
because we require the availability of GAAP ETR for most of our tests, our sample is limited to firms with pre-tax 
profits. 
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4. Sample and Empirical Results 
4.1 Sample construction  
Regulation G, implemented by the SEC in March 2003, mandates that if a firm discloses 
non-GAAP earnings to the public, it must also disclose the most directly comparable GAAP 
earnings and prepare a reconciliation of the non-GAAP metric to the GAAP metric. With the 
implementation of Regulation G, firms also must file 8-Ks for earnings announcements. Hence, 
we rely on 8-Ks to identify non-GAAP exclusion items and the tax effects of non-GAAP 
exclusions. To build the hand-collection sample, we first obtain an index dataset from WRDS SEC 
Analytics Suite. The index dataset contains the identifying information (e.g., firm identifier, filing 
type, and url) of all filings available on EDGAR since 1994. Restricting the form type to “8-K”, 
and item number “2.02” (“Results of Operations and Financial Condition”), we begin our sample 
construction with 201,715 observations between 2004 and 2014. We then use the SEC Analytics 
Suite to remotely parse Form 8-Ks. We retain 8-Ks that discuss non-GAAP performance metrics 
and tax-related words. This step yields a sample of 18,219 Form 8-Ks that are candidates for hand-
collection.13  
 We identify three types of disclosure formats for the tax effect of non-GAAP adjustments. 
We provide an example of each type in Appendix B. Under “Type I” disclosure (see Appendix B, 
Example 1), firms disclose all adjustments net of tax and do not separately report the tax effect of 
adjustments. As an outsider, there is no way of knowing the tax effect of these adjustments. The 
SEC is concerned about this lack of tax effect disclosure and explicitly forbids firms from doing 
so in the two C&DIs issued in 2010 and 2016. The SEC also sent comment letters to firms that 
                                                 
13 We identify 8-K that discuss non-GAAP performance metrics using the following keywords: “non-gaap” or “non 
gaap” or “pro forma” or “pro-forma” or “reconcil.” 
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reported non-GAAP adjustments “net of tax.”14 We find that 14.9% of firm-quarters (2,715 out of 
18,219) provide “net of tax” disclosure.  
Under “Type II” disclosure (see Appendix B, Example 2), firms present all pretax non-
GAAP adjustment items first, and then present the total tax effect of these adjustments. For firms 
using this disclosure format, we can compute the overall tax rate applied to non-GAAP adjustments. 
However, we cannot work out the tax rate applied to each adjustment item. We find 1,335 firm-
quarters that use the Type II disclosure format. Under “Type III” disclosure (see Appendix B, 
Example 3), for each exclusion item, the firm presents the amount of adjustment and the tax effect. 
Alternatively, the firm presents both pretax and after-tax adjustment amounts, so users can work 
out the “tax effect” on a particular adjustment item. This type of disclosure provides the most 
detailed information regarding the tax rates firms apply to non-GAAP adjustments. We can 
calculate the overall non-GAAP tax rate, as well as the tax rate applied to each adjustment item. 
We find 2,446 firm-quarters that use the Type III disclosure format.  
 Because our research design requires us to quantify the non-GAAP tax rate, only those 
firm-quarters using Type II or Type III disclosure formats enter our test sample. For every firm-
quarter observation, we manually code 14 non-GAAP exclusion items. The 14 categories are 
chosen based on our review of typical non-GAAP exclusions from an initial random sample of 
100 observations, the I/B/E/S Manual, and prior non-GAAP studies that hand-collect exclusions 
(e.g., Black et al. 2017; Bentley et al. 2018; Brown et al. 2017).15 In addition, we create a 15th 
                                                 
14 For example, in a comment letter issued to Dole Foods on March 9, 2012, the SEC wrote, “We note that the 
adjustments to income (loss) from continuing operations to arrive at comparable income (loss) from continuing 
operations, are shown net of income taxes. Please tell us how you determine the income tax effects on these 
adjustments and confirm to us that you will provide such disclosure in the future.” 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/18169/000000000012012405/0000000000-12-012405-index.htm  
15 https://wrds-web.wharton.upenn.edu/wrds/support/Data/_001Manuals%20and%20Overviews/_003I-B-E-
S/_001IBES%20Estimates/Data%20Manuals/_020TF%20Methodology%20for%20Estimates%20October%202009.
pdf.cfm  
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category for “other” adjustments. The 15 categories are: (1) restructuring costs; (2) acquisition-
related; (3) depreciation and amortization; (4) asset writedown; (5) litigation-related; (6) stock 
compensation; (7) debt extinguishment; (8) foreign currency exchange; (9) non-recurring tax 
items;16 (10) discontinued operations; (11) change in fair value; (12) pension-related; (13) gains 
and losses from asset sale; (14) inventory step-up; (15) other.  
For each type of adjustment, we collect the amount of the adjustment, and the tax effect of 
the adjustment if available. Among the 15 categories of adjustments, non-recurring tax items is 
special in the sense that it is an adjustment that directly affects the income tax provision. Non-
recurring tax items typically include one-time tax charges (benefits) resulting from settlements, 
foreign earnings repatriations, UTB adjustments, etc. Because these one-time tax expense (benefit) 
exclusions directly flow into the tax expense line in the non-GAAP reconciliation table, it is 
impractical to calculate a non-GAAP tax rate on this item (a detailed discussion on non-recurring 
tax items can be found in Donelson et al. 2017 and Bratten et al. 2017).  
4.2 Descriptive statistics of non-GAAP tax rates 
 We compute the non-GAAP tax rate, i.e., the tax rate that firms apply to non-GAAP 
exclusions, as follows. We first sum up the total pretax adjustment amount (excluding non-
recurring tax items). For firm-quarters using the Type II disclosure format, the non-GAAP tax rate 
is calculated as the total tax effect of exclusions divided by the total pretax exclusion amount. 
Using Hewlett-Packard in Appendix B as an example, the total pretax non-GAAP adjustment = 
(424 + 235 + 51) = $710 million. The tax effect is $184 million. For Hewlett-Packard, the non-
GAAP tax rate is 184/710 = 26%.17 
                                                 
16 Throughout the paper nonrecurring tax items and discrete tax items are used interchangeably.  
17 For Type II disclosure, if the firm also excludes discrete tax items (in addition to adjusting for the tax effects of non-
GAAP exclusions), we carefully make sure that we do not include the discrete tax item in our calculation of non-
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For firm-quarters using the Type III disclosure format, we first sum up the tax effects on 
all 14 adjustment items (excluding nonrecurring tax items), and divide this total tax effect by the 
total pretax adjustment amount. Using Analogic Corporation in Appendix B as an example, the 
total pretax non-GAAP adjustment = (2.644 + 0.075 + 0.741) = $3.46 million. Total tax effect = 
(2.644 – 1.821) + (0.075 – 0.049) + (0.741 – 0.478) = $1.112 million. The non-GAAP tax rate is 
1.112/3.46 = 32%. We winsorize non-GAAP tax rates at 1% tails.18 
 Table 2, Panel A presents the descriptive statistics of non-GAAP tax rates. For firm-
quarters that use the Type II disclosure format, the mean (median) non-GAAP tax rate is 31.4% 
(32.1%), and for firm-quarters that use the Type III disclosure format, the mean (median) non-
GAAP tax rate is 30.7% (32.8%). The mean non-GAAP tax rates for Type II and Type III 
observations are not significantly different. Panel A also presents the non-GAAP tax rates for 
subsamples with income-increasing and income-decreasing exclusions. Consistent with prior 
findings that firms use non-GAAP metrics to report better “core” earnings (Bradshaw and Sloan 
2002; Bhattacharya et al. 2003), we have far more observations with income-increasing exclusions 
than observations with income-decreasing exclusions (2,298 versus 416). We find that the mean 
non-GAAP tax rate is 38.5% for firm-quarters with income-decreasing exclusions, and 29.6% for 
firm-quarters with income-increasing exclusions. Assuming that income-increasing and income-
decreasing exclusions include a similar composition of different exclusion items, the tax rate 
applied to both types of exclusions should be similar. The lower rate applied to income-increasing 
                                                 
GAAP tax rates by reading the footnotes to the GAAP to non-GAAP reconciliation table. In Table 2 Panel A, the 
distribution of the non-GAAP tax rate for Type II disclosure is similar to that of Type III disclosure, suggesting that 
the possible presence of discrete tax items does not raise data quality concerns for the Type II disclosure subsample. 
In robustness tests (Section 4.6), we exclude Type II observations that may have discrete tax items (identified using 
the approach in Bratten et al. 2017) and our main results are unaffected. 
18 Unlike GAAP or cash effective tax rates which are undefined if the pretax income is zero or negative, non-GAAP 
tax rates are defined when the denominator (total non-GAAP exclusions) is positive or negative. In addition, we 
carefully verify that non-GAAP tax rates falling out of the (0,1) range do not represent data errors, so we choose to 
winsorize non-GAAP tax rate at 1% tails to reduce the effect of outliers, rather than winsorize it arbitrarily at (0,1). 
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exclusions provides some preliminary evidence of manager opportunism, i.e., applying a lower 
(higher) rate to positive (negative) exclusions, so that after-tax non-GAAP earnings are higher. 
In Table 2 Panel B, we report the mean non-GAAP tax rate on each type of non-GAAP 
exclusions (using Type III observations). The non-GAAP tax rate varies between 25.8% (on 
mergers and acquisitions) and 38.9% (on pension-related adjustments). The cross-item variation 
in non-GAAP tax rates can be used to identify whether the exclusion item represents a permanent 
book-tax difference. We revisit Table 2 Panel B in Section 4.4.2.  
4.3 Descriptive statistics of variables used in testing H1 and H2 
Table 3 reports descriptive statistics for variables used in testing H1 and H2. Our first 
hypothesis concerns whether managers use non-GAAP tax rates strategically to meet or beat 
analyst consensus forecasts. As described in Section 3, we first compute the effect of using a non-
GAAP tax rate that differs from GAAP ETR or the statutory rate on after-tax non-GAAP earnings 
(∆NG_EARNETR and ∆NG_EARNSTR). We use year-to-date GAAP ETR and the statutory tax rate 
as proxies for the non-discretionary portion of non-GAAP tax rates. ∆NG_EARNETR and 
∆NG_EARNSTR are multiplied by 100 for ease of presentation. The mean values of ∆NG_EARNETR 
and ∆NG_EARNSTR are positive, suggesting that the use of a non-GAAP tax rate that differs from 
GAAP ETR or statutory rate on average increases after-tax non-GAAP earnings. Over 60% of 
firm-quarters meet or beat analyst consensus, consistent with prior research (e.g., Doyle et al. 
2013). The mean non-GAAP exclusion scaled by total assets (Total_ADJ) is positive, suggesting 
that on average non-GAAP adjustments are income-increasing (e.g., Bradshaw and Sloan 2002; 
Bhattacharya et al. 2003). The distribution of the control variables (book-to-market, ROA, sales 
growth, and size) are generally comparable with prior studies.  
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In Table 3 Panel B, we divide our sample into four subsamples, based on the sign of non-
GAAP exclusions and whether the firm-quarter meets or beats the analyst consensus. For firm-
quarters with income-increasing (income-decreasing) exclusions, MBE = 1 observations have 
significantly lower (higher) non-GAAP tax rate compared to MBE = 0 observations. As illustrated 
in Appendix A, applying a lower (higher) non-GAAP tax rate on income-increasing (income-
decreasing) exclusions increases after-tax non-GAAP earnings. We also compare ∆NG_EARNETR 
(∆NG_EARNSTR) for firm-quarters that meet or beat analysts’ consensus and firm-quarters that fail 
to meet or beat. If the discretionary use of non-GAAP tax rates helps firms meet analysts’ 
expectations, ∆NG_EARNETR (∆NG_EARNSTR) should be larger for MBE = 1 firm-quarters. This 
is indeed the case. For both ∆NG_EARNETR and ∆NG_EARNSTR, the mean values are significantly 
greater in the MBE = 1 subsample than in the MBE = 0 subsample (with the exception of 
∆NG_EARNSTR in the exclusions < 0 subsample).  
We also compare year-to-date GAAP ETR with non-GAAP tax rates in the four 2×2 
scenarios. For firm-quarters with income-increasing exclusions (Exclusions > 0), the non-GAAP 
tax rate is significantly lower than GAAP ETR when MBE = 1, and insignificantly different from 
GAAP ETR when MBE = 0. For firm-quarters with income-decreasing exclusions (Exclusions < 
0), the non-GAAP tax rate is significantly higher than GAAP ETR when MBE = 1, and 
insignificantly different from GAAP ETR when MBE = 0. To the extent that GAAP ETR is the 
“correct” rate to use, Panel B provides preliminary evidence that firms use non-GAAP tax rates 
opportunistically, i.e., apply a low (high) tax rate to income-increasing (income-decreasing) 
exclusions. 
 Table 3 Panel C presents correlations for variables used in our main regressions. As 
expected, the magnitude of total non-GAAP exclusions (Total_ADJ) is positively associated with 
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the likelihood of meeting or beating analysts’ consensus forecasts (MBE). In addition, the effect 
of discretionary non-GAAP tax rates on non-GAAP earnings (∆NG_EARNETR and ∆NG_EARNSTR) 
is also positively associated with meeting or beating. The correlations between meeting or beating 
(MBE) and control variables in Eq. (1a) and (1b) are generally consistent with prior research. For 
example, more profitable (ROA) and higher growth (Sales_Growth) firms are more likely to meet 
or beat (Doyle et al. 2013). We do not find a significant correlation between meeting or beating 
and firm size and book-to-market ratio.   
4.4 Testing H1 
4.4.1 Testing H1: main results  
In Table 4, we estimate Eq. (1a) and (1b) controlling for factors that prior studies show are 
associated with meeting or beating analysts’ earnings expectations. In Column 1, ∆NG_EARNETR 
is calculated using GAAP ETR as the proxy for the non-discretionary non-GAAP tax rate. In 
Column 2, the statutory tax rate is used to proxy for non-discretionary non-GAAP rate and the 
variable of interest is ∆NG_EARNSTR. We see that the coefficients on both ∆NG_EARNETR  and 
∆NG_EARNSTR are positive and significant, suggesting that the discretionary use of a non-GAAP 
tax rate that differs from GAAP ETR or the statutory rate increases the likelihood of meeting or 
beating analysts’ consensus. The total non-GAAP exclusion (Total_ADJ) is also strongly 
positively associated with the likelihood of meeting or beating, consistent with prior research. 
Because we control for pre-tax total non-GAAP exclusions (Total_ADJ), our ∆NG_EARNETR 
(∆NG_EARNSTR) variable captures only the incremental effect of discretionary non-GAAP tax 
rates.  
We also employ an alternative model specification used in prior research to examine 
whether firms use their discretion in non-GAAP tax rates to meet or beat analysts’ earnings 
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forecasts. Following Dhaliwal et al. (2004) and Krull (2004), we estimate the following model 
using OLS regression:  
∆NG_EARNETRit = 0 + 1MissAmountit + 2Total_ADJit + Controls + Year FE + Qtr FE + it (3a) 
∆NG_EARNSTRit = 0 + 1MissAmountit + 2Total_ADJit + Controls + Year FE + Qtr FE + it (3b) 
where MissAmount is the consensus analyst forecast minus non-GAAP earnings calculated 
using GAAP ETR or the statutory rate, multiplied by the number of shares used to calculate diluted 
EPS and scaled by total assets. A positive MissAmount indicates that the pre-managed non-GAAP 
earnings fall short of the earnings target. MissAmount is set to zero if pre-managed non-GAAP 
earnings meet or beat the earnings target. We expect 1 to be positive, i.e., if pre-managed non-
GAAP earnings fall short of analyst consensus, managers have incentives to use non-GAAP tax 
rates strategically to increase the reported after-tax non-GAAP earnings.  
Results are presented in Table 5. In Column 1, GAAP ETR is used as a proxy for the non-
discretionary non-GAAP tax rate. In Column 2, the statutory tax rate is used as a proxy for the 
non-discretionary non-GAAP tax rate. The coefficient on MissAmount is positive and significant 
in both columns, suggesting that managers use non-GAAP tax rates to report higher after-tax non-
GAAP earnings when the pre-managed non-GAAP earnings fall short of earnings targets.  
4.4.2 Discussion on permanent book-tax differences  
 One concern about our analysis above is that the exclusion items might be treated 
differently for book and tax purposes. If an exclusion is treated as a gain (loss) for book purposes 
but not taxable (deductible) for tax purposes, the non-GAAP tax rate applied to it should be zero. 
For such exclusions, the firm’s GAAP ETR is no longer a good benchmark for the non-GAAP tax 
rate, and neither is the statutory tax rate. We address and discuss this issue from two aspects.  
 First, for the subsample of firms that use the Type III disclosure format, we compute the 
average non-GAAP tax rate applied to each type of exclusion item. We assume that firms treat 
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exclusions in a similar way, i.e., if an item represents a permanent book-tax difference, most firms 
in the sample apply a zero tax rate on it. By observing the cross-item variation in non-GAAP tax 
rates, we can ex post identify which items are likely to represent permanent book-tax differences. 
Table 2, Panel B reports the mean and median values of the non-GAAP tax rate applied to each 
type of exclusion. Although there is some cross-item variation, the mean (median) values of non-
GAAP tax rates are 25.8% (29.2%) or higher, suggesting that the exclusion items are not treated 
as permanent book-tax differences by most firms in our sample.  
 Second, firms are required to prepare a reconciliation between GAAP ETR and the 
statutory tax rate in the income tax footnote. The reconciliation table summarizes the main sources 
of permanent book-tax differences. We identify a list of common permanent book-tax differences 
from Drake et al. (2017). Drake et al. (2017) hand-collect ETR reconciliation disclosures from a 
large set of firms and classify the reconciliation items into 23 categories. We compare our list of 
exclusion items with their list of permanent book-tax difference items. We find that there is only 
a small amount of overlap between the two lists. Items that appear in both lists include: asset write-
down (“intangible and goodwill effect” in Drake et al. 2017), stock compensation (“stock option”), 
and M&A (“M&A effect”). From Panel B of Table 2, we see that the mean non-GAAP tax rates 
on asset writedown, stock compensation, and M&A are 0.27, 0.28, and 0.26, respectively. 
Compared to non-GAAP rates on other exclusion items, these three items indeed have lower non-
GAAP tax rates (although not as low as zero).  
In Table 6, we drop firm-quarters that exclude at least one of the three items: asset write-
down, stock compensation, and M&A. We then re-estimate Eq. (1a) and (1b). Because the three 
items are fairly common non-GAAP exclusions, our sample size decreases significantly to 1,372 
firm-quarters. The coefficient on ∆NG_EARNETR (∆NG_EARNSTR) continues to be positive and 
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significant, mitigating the concern that the existence of permanent book-tax difference items drives 
our main results.  
4.4.3 Testing H1: subsample analysis by disclosure type  
 We perform a subsample analysis based on how firms disclose the tax effect of non-GAAP 
adjustments. As discussed earlier, some firms disclose the tax effect of non-GAAP adjustments as 
a lump sum (Type II disclosure; see Appendix B Example 2), while some separately disclose the 
tax effect of each line item adjustment (Type III disclosure; see Appendix B Example 3). Most 
firms use the Type III format. We conjecture that firms that use non-GAAP tax rates strategically 
have incentives to provide fewer details. Hence, we expect the main effect to concentrate in the 
Type II disclosure subsample. We estimate Equations (1a) and (1b) separately for Type II and 
Type III observations and the results are reported in Table 7.  
The main result carries over to both subsamples. The coefficients on ∆NG_EARNETR 
(∆NG_EARNSTR) are positive and significant in all columns. The coefficients are not significantly 
different across the subsamples, so we fail to find evidence that the main effect is more pronounced 
in the Type II subsample. This test attempts to distinguish the different managerial incentives 
behind Type II and Type III disclosures. We note that firms that do not disclose the tax effect of 
non-GAAP exclusions at all are the most likely to behave strategically. However, we are unable 
to test this conjecture due to the lack of disclosure. 
4.4.4 Testing H1: subsample analysis by the relative magnitude of recurring versus nonrecurring 
exclusions  
 Doyle et al. (2003) find that non-special item exclusions are associated with future cash 
flows, and excluding such recurring items reflects greater manager opportunism. We examine 
whether the main effect varies depending on the relative magnitude of recurring versus 
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nonrecurring exclusions. We follow Black et al. (2017) and classify the 14 non-GAAP adjustments 
as recurring versus non-recurring.19 Consistent with Lougee and Marquardt (2004), who find that 
firms are more likely to report non-GAAP earnings when they have non-recurring items, in our 
sample (which consists only of firms that report non-GAAP earnings), the magnitude of non-
recurring items is much larger than that of recurring items. For 75% (=2,022/2,714) of our sample, 
the magnitude of nonrecurring exclusions is greater than 50% of total exclusions.  
We estimate Eq. (1a) and (1b) separately for two subsamples: (1) the magnitude of non-
recurring items exceeds 50% of total adjustments; (2) the magnitude of non-recurring items is less 
than 50% of total adjustments. We find that our main result is concentrated in the subsample where 
the majority of non-GAAP adjustments are nonrecurring. Hence, although excluding recurring 
items reflects greater managerial opportunism (Doyle et al. 2003), in our setting we only find 
evidence of opportunism when firms exclude more nonrecurring items. One explanation is that it 
is more difficult for outsiders to evaluate the tax effect of nonrecurring items, so for managers, it 
is less costly to manipulate the tax rates applied to such items. Another explanation is that, analysts 
do not always follow managers’ non-GAAP reporting choice (e.g., Bentley et al. 2018). For 
example, Gu and Chen (2004) find that analysts have expertise in identifying items (excluded by 
managers) that are likely to persist and include such items in their earnings forecasts. Hence, if 
managers exclude recurring items while the analysts (and IBES) do not exclude recurring items, 
manipulating tax rates applied to recurring items will not help the firm meet or beat expectations.  
Overall, our analysis suggests that the discretionary use of non-GAAP tax rates on average 
increases firms’ reported non-GAAP earnings and the likelihood of meeting or beating analysts’ 
                                                 
19  Non-recurring items include restructuring charges, acquisition-related, asset impairments and writedowns, 
litigation-related, debt extinguishment, discontinued operations, gains and losses from assets, and other items. 
Recurring items include depreciation and amortization, stock compensation, foreign currency exchange, fair value 
adjustment, pension-related, and inventory step-up. 
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earnings expectations. This effect holds for both types of disclosure formats and is concentrated 
among firms for which the majority of non-GAAP exclusions are nonrecurring.  
4.5 Testing H2: discretionary non-GAAP tax rates and earnings persistence  
 H2 predicts that, if firms use non-GAAP tax rates strategically, the tax rate applied to non-
GAAP adjustments could be too high or too low. Hence, the reported after-tax non-GAAP earnings 
contain a fraction of the transitory exclusion items and will thus be less persistent for future 
performance. We estimate Eq. (2a) – (2c) and report the results in Table 9. Column (1) reports 
results estimating Eq. (2a), and Columns (2) and (3) report results estimating Eq. (2b) and (2c) 
using GAAP ETR and the statutory rate as proxies for non-discretionary non-GAAP tax rates. H2 
predicts that 1 < γ1, i.e., the reported non-GAAP earnings are less persistent compared to non-
GAAP earnings calculated using GAAP ETR or the statutory rate. If the discretionary use of non-
GAAP tax rates makes non-GAAP earnings less informative, we also expect the explanatory 
power of Eq. (2a) to be lower compared to Eq. (2b) and (2c).  
In Column (1), the coefficient on the current quarter’s reported non-GAAP earnings is 
positive and significant (1 = 0.531***), consistent with prior research that non-GAAP earnings 
capture “core” earnings that are persistent. In Column (2), we separate the reported non-GAAP 
earnings into two components, NG_EARNETR, calculated by applying GAAP ETR to exclusions, 
and ∆NG_EARNETR, calculated as the difference between the reported non-GAAP earnings 
(NG_EARN) and NG_EARNETR. The coefficient on NG_EARNETR (γ1) is 0.563, and is significantly 
greater than 1 in Eq. (2a). The Vuong test also suggests that separating non-GAAP earnings into 
two components improves the model’s explanatory power, i.e., the adjusted R-squared of Eq. (2b) 
is significantly greater than that of Eq. (2a).  
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In Column (3), we repeat the analysis in Column (2) but use the statutory rate to proxy for 
the non-discretionary non-GAAP tax rate. The coefficient on NG_EARNSTR is 0.583, and is 
significantly greater than 1 in Eq. (2a). The improvement in explanatory power (0.292 versus 
0.265) is also statistically significant. Overall, the earnings persistent test is consistent with H2 
that non-GAAP tax rates used by managers are too high or too low relative to GAAP ETR and the 
statutory rate, thus causing some transitory exclusion items to be included in the reported non-
GAAP earnings, making it less persistent.  
4.6 Robustness checks  
 Use annual and quarterly GAAP ETR as proxies for the non-discretionary non-GAAP tax 
rate. In our main analysis, we use the year-to-date GAAP ETR as a proxy for the non-discretionary 
non-GAAP tax rate. We choose year-to-date GAAP ETR because it represents the information that 
managers have when making non-GAAP adjustments (compared to annual GAAP ETR), and it is 
less likely to be contaminated by discrete tax items recognized in the quarter (compared to 
quarterly GAAP ETR). In Table 10 Panel A, we re-estimate Eq. (1a) and (1b) using annual and 
quarterly GAAP ETRs as alternative proxies for the non-discretionary non-GAAP tax rate. Results 
are qualitatively similar.  
 Exclude Type II firms with discrete tax items. If managers adjust for discrete tax items when 
reporting non-GAAP earnings, the discrete tax items directly flow into the income tax adjustment 
line for firms that use the Type II disclosure format (i.e., firms that disclose the tax effect on all 
non-GAAP exclusions as a lump sum, see Appendix B Example 2). We read non-GAAP 
reconciliation footnotes carefully to make sure that discrete tax items do not enter our calculation 
of non-GAAP tax rates for Type II firms. However, to further ensure that our results are not driven 
by firms with discrete tax items, we drop firm-quarters using Type II disclosure and at the same 
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time reporting discrete tax items.20 Results are reported in Table 10 Panel B. Our sample size 
decreases from 2,714 to 2,253, and all inferences remain similar.  
5. Conclusion 
 In this study, we investigate a decision many firms have to make when disclosing non-
GAAP earnings – the tax rate applied to non-GAAP adjustments. The calculation and presentation 
of the tax effect of non-GAAP exclusions have recently become one of the focus areas of the SEC. 
The SEC Division of Corporation Finance issued and updated the Compliance and Disclosure 
Interpretations (C&DIs) in 2010 and 2016. Both C&DIs require companies to clearly present and 
explain the tax effects of non-GAAP adjustments. Since 2010, the SEC has also issued 140 
comment letters requesting firms to provide additional details on the tax effects of non-GAAP 
exclusions.  
 Consistent with the SEC’s concern in tax reporting in the non-GAAP setting, we find that 
a nontrivial amount of firms do not clearly present the tax effect of non-GAAP adjustments. In 
addition, firms that do disclose the tax effects rarely explain how they determine the non-GAAP 
tax rates. We hypothesize that managers face unique cost-benefit tradeoffs when deciding on their 
non-GAAP tax rates due to the complexity of the tax account and the discretionary nature of non-
GAAP reporting in general. We find robust evidence that the use of discretionary non-GAAP tax 
rates increases firms’ chances of meeting or beating analysts’ earnings forecasts. This result holds 
for both types of disclosure formats (Type II and III). To the extent that it is more difficult for 
outsiders to unwind the tax effect of nonrecurring exclusions, it is less costly for managers to 
                                                 
20 To identify firms with discrete tax items, we follow the approach in Bratten et al. (2017). For firm i in quarter q, we 
first compute the GAAP ETR (txtq/piq), and we obtain the IBES actual tax rate from IBES Actuals (the actu_xepsus 
file). We compare the quarterly GAAP ETR with the IBES actual tax rate. If the difference between the two tax rates 
is within ±1%, we conclude that there are no discrete tax items for the quarter.  
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manipulate non-GAAP tax rates when the majority of exclusions are non-recurring. We find that 
the main result is concentrated among firms with more nonrecurring non-GAAP exclusions. 
Finally, we find that the reported non-GAAP earnings are less persistent for one-year-ahead GAAP 
earnings compared to non-GAAP earnings calculated using GAAP ETR or the statutory rate. The 
lower persistence of the reported non-GAAP earnings suggests that the discretionary use of non-
GAAP tax rates causes a fraction of the largely transitory non-GAAP adjustments to flow into the 
reported after-tax non-GAAP earnings, making it less informative. 
 Our study provides the first large sample evidence on the use and reporting of non-GAAP 
tax rates. Our study is of interest to the SEC, as well as users of non-GAAP information, including 
analysts, investors, and researchers. Our findings suggest that a discrepancy between non-GAAP 
tax rates and GAAP ETR (or the statutory rate) may raise a red flag about managerial opportunism 
and the informativeness of the reported after-tax non-GAAP numbers. Given the updated 
Compliance and Disclosure Interpretations in 2016 and the increasing volume of SEC comment 
letters that request firms to improve their disclosure of non-GAAP tax rates, future research can 
explore the time-series change in firms’ reporting behavior in this area. 
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Appendix A: Non-GAAP tax rate and income-increasing (income-decreasing) exclusions 
 
Non-GAAP exclusions are income-increasing  
 
A firm reports “core” earnings of $100, and a restructuring charge of $50, GAAP total tax expense of $15. 
The GAAP ETR is 15/(100-50) = 30%. The GAAP net income is $100 – 50 – 15 = $35. The table below 
compares two scenarios. In Scenario 1, the firm applies a 30% tax on non-GAAP exclusions (i.e., the 
restructuring charge). In Scenario 2, the firm applies a 25% tax rate on non-GAAP exclusions. 
 
 1. Non-GAAP tax rate = 
GAAP ETR = 30% 
2. Non-GAAP tax rate = 25% 
< GAAP ETR 
Net GAAP income   $35 $35 
Add:    
Pretax restructuring charge $50 $50 
Subtract:    
Tax effect on restructuring  $15 (50*30%) $12.5 (50*25%) 
After-tax non-GAAP income $70 (35 + 50 – 15) $72.5 (35 + 50 – 12.5) 
 
Non-GAAP exclusions are income-decreasing 
 
A firm reports “core” earnings of $100, and gain from asset sale of $50, GAAP total tax expense of $45. 
The GAAP ETR is 45/(100+50) = 30%. The GAAP net income is $100 + 50 – 45 = $105. The table below 
compares two scenarios. In Scenario 1, the firm applies a 30% tax on non-GAAP exclusions (i.e., the gain 
from asset sale). In Scenario 2, the firm applies a 35% tax rate on non-GAAP exclusions. 
 
 1. Non-GAAP tax rate = 
GAAP ETR = 30% 
2. Non-GAAP tax rate = 
35% > GAAP ETR 
Net GAAP income   $105 $105 
Subtract:    
Pretax gain from asset sale $50 $50 
Add:    
Tax effect on gain from asset sale  $15 (50*30%) $17.5 (50*35%) 
After-tax non-GAAP income $70 (105 – 50 + 15) $72.5 (105 – 50 + 17.5) 
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Appendix B: Examples of the tax adjustment on exclusion items 
 
Example 1: Type I disclosure (non-GAAP exclusions are presented “net-of-tax”) 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/15615/000119312513196408/d530459dex991.htm 
 
MasTec Inc. 
Reconciliation of Non-GAAP Disclosures and Supplemental Disclosures-Unaudited 
(In millions, except for percentages and per share amounts) 
Adjusted Net Income and Earnings per Share Reconciliations 
  
     Three Months   
     March 31,   
     2013     2012   
Adjusted Net Income Reconciliation            
Income from continuing operations before non-controlling interests    $ 19.3     $ 11.7   
Loss on extinguishment of debt, net of tax      3.4       —     
Adjusted income from continuing operations    $ 22.8     $ 11.7   
(Loss) income from discontinued operations, net of tax      (0.9 )      2.5   
Adjusted net income    $ 21.8     $ 14.2   
 
 
Example 2: Type II disclosure (tax effects on non-GAAP exclusions are presented as a lump sum) 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/47217/000004721710000041/q4ex99-1_112210.htm 
 
HEWLETT-PACKARD COMPANY AND SUBSIDIARIES 
ADJUSTMENTS TO GAAP NET EARNINGS, EARNINGS FROM OPERATIONS, 
OPERATING MARGIN AND EARNINGS PER SHARE 
(Unaudited) 
(In millions except per share amounts) 
 
    
Three months 
ended October 31, 
2010 
GAAP net earnings   $ 2,538  
         
Non-GAAP adjustments:        
       Amortization of purchased intangible assets 424  
       Restructuring charges    235  
       Acquisition-related charges    51  
       Adjustments for taxes    (184 ) 
Non-GAAP net earnings   $ 3,064  
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Appendix B (continued) 
Example 3: Type III disclosure (tax effects are separately reported for each exclusion item) 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/6284/000119312512493796/d450049dex991.htm 
Analogic Corporation 
NON-GAAP STATEMENTS OF OPERATIONS 
RECONCILIATION 
  
(In thousands, except per share data)    Three Months Ended   
     
October 31, 
2012     
October 31, 
2011   
GAAP Income From Operations    $ 7,435     $ 5,584   
Share-based compensation expense      2,644       2,251   
B-K distributor matter inquiry related costs      75       997   
Acquisition-related expenses      741       766   
Non-GAAP Income From Operations    $ 10,895     $ 9,598   
Percentage of Total Net Revenue      9.1 %     8.1 %  
GAAP Net Income    $ 4,381     $ 4,026   
Share-based compensation expense      1,821       1,551   
B-K distributor matter inquiry related costs      49       639   
Acquisition-related expenses      478       491   
Non-GAAP Net Income    $ 6,729     $ 6,707   
Note: in this example, Analogic Corporation has three exclusion items: share-based compensation expense, B-K 
distributor matter inquiry related costs, and acquisition-related expenses. Each of these three exclusions is presented 
both before tax and after tax, so we are able to work out the tax effect on each exclusion item. For example, the tax 
effect on share-based compensation expense is $2,644 – $1,821 = $823.  
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Appendix C: Variable Definitions 
Variable Definition 
BTM Book-to-market ratio, computed as common/ordinary equity (ceqq) 
divided by market value of equity (prccq*cshoq). 
EARN GAAP earnings (ibq) scaled by total assets (atq), multiplied by 100 for 
ease of presentation.  
GAAP_ETR Year-to-date GAAP effective tax rates, calculated as year-to-date total tax 
expense (txtq) scaled by year-to-date pre-tax income (piq), set to missing 
if pre-tax income is non-positive, or GAAP ETR is greater than one or 
smaller than zero. 
MBE Indicator variable coded one if reported non-GAAP earnings per share is 
greater than or equal to the median consensus analyst forecast, and zero 
otherwise. 
MissAmount The median consensus analyst forecast minus non-GAAP earnings 
calculated using GAAP ETR or statutory rate, multiplied by number of 
shares (cshfdq) and scaled by total assets (atq), multiplied by 100 for ease 
of presentation.  
NG_EARN Actual after-tax non-GAAP earnings reported by the firm, calculated as 
GAAP earnings before extraordinary items (ibq) plus total pre-tax non-
GAAP adjustments (Total_ADJ), minus the tax effect of adjustments and 
nonrecurring tax items. Total pre-tax non-GAAP adjustments and total tax 
effect of adjustments are hand-collected from 8-Ks. For Type III 
observations, the nonrecurring tax item is hand-collected from 8-Ks. For 
Type II observations, we use Compustat variable nrtxtq to proxy for 
nonrecurring tax items. NG_EARN is scaled by total assets (atq) and 
multiplied by 100 for ease of presentation.  
NG_EARNETR Non-GAAP earnings calculated by applying GAAP ETR to non-GAAP 
exclusions. Computed as follows: GAAP earnings before extraordinary 
items (ibq) plus total pre-tax non-GAAP adjustments (Total_ADJ), minus 
the tax effect of adjustments (Total_ADJ×GAAP_ETR) and nonrecurring 
tax items. NG_EARNETR is scaled by total assets (atq) and multiplied by 
100 for ease of presentation.  
NG_EARNSTR Non-GAAP earnings calculated by applying the statutory tax rate to non-
GAAP exclusions. Computed as follows: GAAP earnings before 
extraordinary items (ibq) plus total pre-tax non-GAAP adjustments 
(Total_ADJ), minus the tax effect of adjustments (Total_ADJ ×35%) and 
nonrecurring tax items. NG_EARNSTR is scaled by total assets (atq) and 
multiplied by 100 for ease of presentation. 
∆NG_EARNETR The effect of using a non-GAAP tax rate that differs from GAAP ETR on 
after-tax non-GAAP earnings, calculated as: NG_EARN - NG_EARNETR. 
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∆NG_EARNETR is scaled by total assets (atq) and multiplied by 100 for 
ease of presentation.  
∆NG_EARNSTR The effect of using a non-GAAP tax rate that differs from the statutory 
rate on after-tax non-GAAP earnings, calculated as: NG_EARN - 
NG_EARNSTR. ∆NG_EARNSTR is scaled by total assets (atq) and multiplied 
by 100 for ease of presentation. 
NonGAAP_TaxRate Tax rate applied on non-GAAP adjustments, computed as the total tax 
effect of non-GAAP adjustments divided by total pre-tax non-GAAP 
adjustments, based on a hand-collected sample from 8-Ks. 
Nonrecur_ADJ Total amount of non-recurring non-GAAP adjustments, scaled by total 
assets (atq) and multiplied by 100 for ease of presentation. Nonrecurring 
adjustments include: restructuring charges, acquisition-related, asset 
impairments and writedowns, litigation-related, debt extinguishment, 
discontinued operations, gains and losses from assets, and other items.  
Recur_ADJ Total amount of recurring non-GAAP adjustments, scaled by total assets 
(atq) and multiplied by 100 for ease of presentation. Recurring 
adjustments includes: depreciation and amortization, stock compensation, 
foreign currency exchange, fair value adjustment, pension-related, and 
inventory step-up.  
ROA Income before extraordinary items (ibq) divided by total assets (atq), 
multiplied by 100 for ease of presentation.  
Sales_Growth Sales growth, computed as quarterly change in sales (saleq) over the same 
quarter in the prior year.  
Size The natural log of total assets (atq). 
TaxRate_X Non-GAAP tax rate applied on each type of non-GAAP adjustments (X). 
Take restructuring charge as an example. TaxRate_Restuc is calculated as 
the tax effect of excluding restructuring charge from GAAP earnings, 
divided by the amount of pre-tax restructuring charge excluded.  
Total_ADJ Total pre-tax non-GAAP adjustments scaled by total assets (atq) and 
multiplied by 100 for ease of presentation. Total_ADJ includes fourteen 
types of adjustments: (1) restructuring costs; (2) acquisition-related; (3) 
depreciation and amortization; (4) asset writedown; (5) litigation-related; 
(6) stock compensation; (7) debt extinguishment; (8) foreign currency 
exchange; (9) discontinued operations; (10) change in fair value; (11) 
pension-related; (12) gains and losses from asset sale; (13) inventory step-
up; (14) other.  Positive Total_ADJ means that non-GAAP earnings are 
greater than GAAP earnings and vice versa.  
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Table 1 Sample selection  
 
Sample screening criteria 
# of firm-
quarter obs 
1. All 8-Ks from 2004 to 2014, with item number 2.02 201,715 
2. Only keep 8-Ks that mention non-GAAP and tax-related keywords  18,219 
    a) Type I disclosure (i.e., non-GAAP exclusions disclosed net of tax) 2,715 
    b) Type II disclosure (i.e., tax effect of non-GAAP adjustments in one line item) 1,335 
    c) Type III disclosure (i.e., separately disclose the tax effect on each exclusion item) 2,446 
    d) Non-GAAP metric is on pretax basis 5,496 
    e) Other (cannot find relevant information, non-GAAP refers to income attributable 
to controlling interest, etc.) 
6,227 
3. Type II and III together 3,781 
4. Firm-quarters with non-missing data to compute non-GAAP and GAAP tax rate 2,830  
5. Firm-quarters with non-missing I/B/E/S and Compustat variables 2,714 
6. Firm-quarters with non-missing one-year-ahead GAAP earnings  2,592 
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Table 2 Descriptive statistics: Non-GAAP tax rates  
 
Panel A: Non-GAAP tax rates by disclosure type and sign of total non-GAAP exclusions  
 N Mean Std Dev P25 Median P75 
Type II 842 0.314 0.407 0.202 0.321 0.378 
Type III 1872 0.307 0.345 0.208 0.328 0.376 
Test mean diff  p-value = 0.64     
 
 N Mean Std Dev P25 Median P75 
Exclusions < 0 416 0.385 0.543 0.242 0.365 0.401 
Exclusions > 0 2298 0.296 0.321 0.203 0.316 0.370 
Test mean diff  p-value < 0.0001     
Note: Panel A presents non-GAAP tax rate by disclosure type and sign of total non-GAAP exclusions. Under “Type 
II” disclosure format, firms disclose the total tax effect of non-GAAP exclusions as a single lump sum. Under “Type 
III” disclosure format, firms separately disclose the tax effect for every exclusion item. Exclusions < 0 (> 0) subsample 
includes firm-quarters with income-decreasing (income-increasing) non-GAAP exclusions. Non-GAAP tax rate is 
calculated as the total tax effect of non-GAAP exclusions divided by the total amount of pre-tax exclusions (excluding 
non-recurring tax items), winsorized at 1% tails.  
 
Panel B: Non-GAAP tax rate by non-GAAP exclusion item 
 
Variable N Mean SD P25 Median P75 
TaxRate_Restruc 898 0.291 0.132 0.226 0.307 0.364 
TaxRate_MA 470 0.258 0.152 0.159 0.292 0.357 
TaxRate_Depr_Amtz 182 0.266 0.154 0.186 0.318 0.369 
TaxRate_Writedown 145 0.265 0.161 0.113 0.324 0.375 
TaxRate_Litigation 162 0.318 0.138 0.292 0.368 0.389 
TaxRate_Stock_Comp 225 0.277 0.146 0.231 0.318 0.366 
TaxRate_Debt_Ex 56 0.343 0.115 0.346 0.373 0.384 
TaxRate_For_Exch 47 0.323 0.247 0.210 0.302 0.379 
TaxRate_Discont 9 0.323 0.104 0.252 0.326 0.389 
TaxRate_FV_Change 113 0.366 0.098 0.364 0.372 0.390 
TaxRate_Pension 67 0.389 0.137 0.340 0.376 0.400 
TaxRate_Asset_Sale 59 0.320 0.120 0.263 0.359 0.391 
TaxRate_Inventory 42 0.319 0.124 0.321 0.359 0.400 
TaxRate_Other 810 0.313 0.163 0.240 0.353 0.383 
Note: Panel B presents non-GAAP tax rates on each type of non-GAAP exclusions calculated using the Type III 
disclosure subsample (1,872 firm-quarters). For each non-GAAP exclusion, the non-GAAP tax rate is calculated as: 
tax effect of the exclusion divided by the pre-tax exclusion amount. Variable definitions are as follows: (1) Restruc: 
restructuring charges; (2) MA: merger and acquisition related charges; (3) Depr_Amtz: depreciation and amortization; 
(4) Writedown: asset write-downs and impairments; (5) Litigation: litigation related charges; (6) Stock_Comp: stock-
based compensation expense; (7) Debt_Ex: debt extingsuihment; (8) For_Exch: foreign currency exchange gains and 
losses; (9) Discont: discontinued operations; (10) FV_Change: fair value adjustments; (11) Pension: pension related; 
(12) Asset_Sale: gains and losses from asset sale; (13) Inventory: inventory related; (14) Other: other non-GAAP 
exclusions.  
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Table 3 Descriptive statistics: Regression variables  
 
Panel A: Summary statistics  
Variable N Mean SD P25 Median P75 
∆NG_EARNETR 2,714 0.024 0.318 -0.023 0.000 0.037 
∆NG_EARNSTR 2,714 0.039 0.271 -0.006 0.007 0.059 
MBE 2,714 0.623 0.485 0.000 1.000 1.000 
Total_ADJ 2,714 0.510 1.168 0.074 0.322 0.738 
BTM 2,714 0.491 0.284 0.282 0.437 0.663 
ROA 2,714 1.615 1.221 0.817 1.391 2.269 
Sales Growth 2,714 0.079 0.213 -0.024 0.047 0.125 
Size 2,714 8.343 1.631 7.099 8.291 9.446 
EARNt+4 2,592 1.489 1.499 0.740 1.402 2.311 
NG_EARN 2,714 1.993 1.408 1.128 1.728 2.630 
NG_EARNETR 2,714 1.973 1.387 1.113 1.733 2.632 
NG_EARNSTR 2,714 1.960 1.363 1.109 1.711 2.589 
Notes: Detailed variable definitions can be found in Appendix C. All continuous variables are winsorized at 1% 
tails. For ease of presentation, ∆NG_EARNETR, ∆NG_EARNSTR, Total_ADJ, ROA, EARNt+4, NG_EARN, 
NG_EARNETR, and NG_EARNSTR are multiplied by 100.  
 
Panel B: The effect of discretionary non-GAAP tax rate on non-GAAP earnings  
 
  
MBE = 0 (n=1022) MBE = 1 (n=1692) 
Difference (p-
value) 
Non-GAAP tax rate 
Exclusions 
> 0 
(n=2298) 
0.331 0.277 0.0001 
GAAP ETR 0.313 0.297 0.003 
∆NG_EARNETR 0.005 0.041 0.009 
∆NG_EARNSTR 0.023 0.072 <0.0001 
     
Non-GAAP tax rate 
Exclusions 
< 0 
(n=416) 
0.333 0.446 0.035 
GAAP ETR 0.313 0.273 0.001 
∆NG_EARNETR -0.035 0.045 0.024 
∆NG_EARNSTR -0.072 -0.031 0.221 
Notes: The MBE = 1 (0) subsample includes firm-quarters that (fail to) meet or beat the median consensus analyst 
forecast. The exclusions > 0 (<0) subsample includes firm-quarters that have income-increasing (income-decreasing) 
non-GAAP exclusions. Sample size in each of the four clusters are as follows: (1) 225 in MBE = 0 and Exclusions < 
0; (2) 797 in MBE = 1 and Exclusions > 0; (3) 191 in MBE = 1 and Exclusions < 0; (4) 1,501 in MBE = 1 and 
Exclusions > 0. GAAP ETR is the year-to-date GAAP effective tax rate, calculated as year-to-date tax expense (txtq) 
divided by year-to-date pre-tax income (piq), set to missing if the denominator is negative or zero or if the rate is 
greater than one or negative. ∆NG_EARNETR (∆NG_EARNSTR) measures the effect of using a discretionary non-GAAP 
tax rate on after-tax non-GAAP earnings, where the discretionary non-GAAP tax rate is calculated as the difference 
between the actual non-GAAP tax rate and GAAP ETR (statutory tax rate). Detailed variable definitions can be found 
in Appendix C. All continuous variables are winsorized at 1% tails.  
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Table 3 (continued)  
Panel C: Pearson correlations 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
(1) ∆NG_EARNETR 1            
(2) ∆NG_EARNSTR 0.80*** 1           
(3) MBE 0.07*** 0.11*** 1          
(4) Total_ADJ 0.25*** 0.41*** 0.13*** 1         
(5) BTM 0.001 -0.02 -0.02 -0.08*** 1        
(6) ROA -0.10*** -0.11*** 0.17*** -0.20*** -0.45*** 1       
(7) Sales Growth -0.02 -0.01 0.12*** -0.03 -0.04* 0.16*** 1      
(8) Size -0.06** -0.04* 0.01 -0.07*** -0.08*** 0.01 -0.05* 1     
(9) EARNt+4 -0.04* 0.01 0.12*** 0.07*** -0.39*** 0.54*** 0.10*** 0.04 1    
(10) NG_EARN 0.23*** 0.32*** 0.25*** 0.43*** -0.44*** 0.75*** 0.13*** -0.03 0.50*** 1   
(11) NG_EARNETR 0.02 0.15*** 0.23*** 0.42*** -0.45*** 0.78*** 0.14*** -0.03 0.52*** 0.96*** 1  
(12) NG_EARNSTR 0.08*** 0.14*** 0.23*** 0.38*** -0.45*** 0.80*** 0.14*** -0.03 0.53*** 0.97*** 0.99*** 1 
Note: ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Detailed variable definitions can be found in Appendix C. All continuous 
variables are winsorized at 1% tails.
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Table 4 Non-GAAP tax rates and the propensity to meet or beat analyst consensus  
 
MBEit = 0 + 1∆NG_EARNETR it + 2Total_ADJit + Controls + Year FE + Qtr FE + it (1a) 
MBEit = 0 + 1∆NG_EARNSTR it + 2Total_ADJit + Controls + Year FE + Qtr FE + it (1b) 
 
  (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Pred. Sign Y = MBE Y = MBE 
    
∆NG_EARNETR + 0.339***  
  (0.120)  
∆NG_EARNSTR +  0.510*** 
   (0.144) 
Total_ADJ + 0.276*** 0.251*** 
  (0.035) (0.037) 
BTM  0.634*** 0.629*** 
  (0.128) (0.127) 
ROA  0.308*** 0.307*** 
  (0.041) (0.041) 
SalesGrowth  0.649*** 0.643*** 
  (0.170) (0.171) 
Size  0.030 0.027 
  (0.021) (0.021) 
Constant  -1.090*** -1.070*** 
  (0.280) (0.279) 
    
Observations  2,714 2,714 
Pseudo R-squared  0.088 0.090 
SE clustered by   Firm Firm 
Year FE  Yes Yes 
Quarter FE  Yes Yes 
Notes: This table reports the results from estimating Eq. (1a) and (1b). In Column (1), GAAP ETR is used to proxy 
for non-discretionary non-GAAP tax rate. In Column (2), the statutory tax date is used to proxy for non-discretionary 
non-GAAP tax rate. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% level, respectively. Detailed variable definitions can be found in Appendix C. 
 
 
 
  
44 
 
Table 5 Non-GAAP tax rates and the propensity to meet or beat analyst consensus – 
Alternative specification 
 
∆NG_EARNETRit = 0 + 1MissAmountit + 2Total_ADJit + Controls + Year FE + Qtr FE + it (3a) 
∆NG_EARNSTRit = 0 + 1MissAmountit + 2Total_ADJit + Controls + Year FE + Qtr FE + it (3b) 
 
VARIABLES Pred. Sign 
(1) (2) 
Y = ∆NG_EARNETR Y = ∆NG_EARNSTR 
    
MissAmount + 0.161***  
  (0.036)  
MissAmount +  0.062* 
   (0.035) 
Total_ADJ + 0.074*** 0.097*** 
  (0.018) (0.014) 
BTM  0.034 0.010 
  (0.033) (0.029) 
ROA  0.001 -0.001 
  (0.014) (0.012) 
Sales_Growth  -0.001 0.007 
  (0.063) (0.057) 
Size  -0.004 -0.000 
  (0.005) (0.005) 
Constant  -0.028 -0.021 
  (0.056) (0.046) 
    
Observations  2,714 2,714 
R-squared  0.110 0.173 
SE clustered by  Firm Firm 
Year FE  Yes Yes 
Quarter FE  Yes Yes 
Notes: This table reports the results from estimating Eq. (3a) and (3b). Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Detailed variable definitions can be 
found in Appendix C. 
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Table 6 Excluding firm-quarter observations with permanent BTD non-GAAP exclusions 
 
MBEit = 0 + 1∆NG_EARNETR it + 2Total_ADJit + Controls + Year FE + Qtr FE + it (1a) 
MBEit = 0 + 1∆NG_EARNSTR it + 2Total_ADJit + Controls + Year FE + Qtr FE + it (1b) 
 
  (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Pred. Sign Y = MBE Y = MBE 
    
∆NG_EARNETR + 0.493**  
  (0.195)  
∆NG_EARNSTR +  0.924*** 
   (0.202) 
Total_ADJ + 0.310*** 0.296*** 
  (0.054) (0.055) 
BTM  0.655*** 0.671*** 
  (0.163) (0.165) 
ROA  0.250*** 0.252*** 
  (0.058) (0.059) 
SalesGrowth  1.062*** 1.058*** 
  (0.346) (0.357) 
Size  0.038 0.034 
  (0.030) (0.030) 
Constant  -0.930** -0.933** 
  (0.364) (0.366) 
    
Observations  1,372 1,372 
Pseudo R-squared  0.083 0.089 
SE clustered by  Firm Firm 
Year FE  Yes Yes 
Quarter FE  Yes Yes 
Notes: This table reports the results from estimating Eq. (1a) and (1b) excluding firm-quarters with permanent BTD 
non-GAAP exclusions. In Column (1), GAAP ETR is used to proxy for non-discretionary non-GAAP tax rate. In 
Column (2), the statutory tax date is used to proxy for non-discretionary non-GAAP tax rate. Robust standard errors 
are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Detailed 
variable definitions can be found in Appendix C.   
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Table 7 Non-GAAP tax rates and the propensity to meet or beat analyst consensus – Analysis 
by disclosure type  
 
MBEit = 0 + 1∆NG_EARNETR it + 2Total_ADJit + Controls + Year FE + Qtr FE + it (1a) 
MBEit = 0 + 1∆NG_EARNSTR it + 2Total_ADJit + Controls + Year FE + Qtr FE + it (1b) 
 
  Type II Type III 
 
Pred. Sign 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Y = MBE Y = MBE Y = MBE Y = MBE 
      
∆NG_EARNETR + 0.353*  0.360**  
  (0.187)  (0.152)  
∆NG_EARNSTR +  0.418**  0.690*** 
   (0.206)  (0.194) 
Total_ADJ + 0.300*** 0.275*** 0.273*** 0.245*** 
  (0.067) (0.071) (0.040) (0.042) 
BTM  0.642** 0.618** 0.602*** 0.605*** 
  (0.292) (0.294) (0.138) (0.136) 
ROA  0.370*** 0.369*** 0.281*** 0.280*** 
  (0.065) (0.065) (0.049) (0.048) 
SalesGrowth  0.148 0.141 1.152*** 1.167*** 
  (0.221) (0.219) (0.229) (0.231) 
Size  0.013 0.009 0.040* 0.038* 
  (0.042) (0.041) (0.023) (0.023) 
Constant  -0.684 -0.634 -1.270*** -1.267*** 
  (0.492) (0.494) (0.312) (0.311) 
      
Observations  842 842 1,872 1,872 
Pseudo R-squared   0.103 0.103 0.0941 0.0977 
SE clustered by  Firm Firm Firm Firm 
Year FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Quarter FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: Columns (1) and (2) report the results from estimating Eq. (1a) and (1b) in the subsample of firms that disclose 
the tax effect of non-GAAP exclusion as a lump sum (Type II disclosure firms). Columns (3) and (4) report the results 
from estimating Eq. (1a) and (1b) in the subsample of firms that disclose the tax effect of every non-GAAP exclusion 
item (Type III disclosure firms). In columns (1) and (3), GAAP ETR is used to proxy for non-discretionary non-GAAP 
tax rate. In columns (2) and (4), the statutory tax date is used to proxy for non-discretionary non-GAAP tax rate. 
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively. Detailed variable definitions can be found in Appendix C. 
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Table 8 Non-GAAP tax rates and the propensity to meet or beat analyst consensus – 
Analysis by the relative magnitude of recurring versus nonrecurring adjustments 
 
MBEit = 0 + 1∆NG_EARNETR it + 2Total_ADJit + Controls + Year FE + Qtr FE + it (1a) 
MBEit = 0 + 1∆NG_EARNSTR it + 2Total_ADJit + Controls + Year FE + Qtr FE + it (1b) 
 
  Nonrecurring adj > 50% Nonrecurring adj <= 50% 
 Pred. 
Sign 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Y = MBE Y = MBE Y = MBE Y = MBE 
      
∆NG_EARNETR + 0.398**  0.261  
  (0.156)  (0.170)  
∆NG_EARNSTR +  0.734***  0.072 
   (0.171)  (0.209) 
Total_ADJ + 0.271*** 0.245*** 0.308*** 0.292*** 
  (0.043) (0.044) (0.059) (0.060) 
BTM  0.602*** 0.618*** 0.668*** 0.665*** 
  (0.147) (0.148) (0.236) (0.235) 
ROA  0.291*** 0.295*** 0.372*** 0.374*** 
  (0.045) (0.045) (0.062) (0.062) 
SalesGrowth  0.796*** 0.807*** 0.401 0.413 
  (0.209) (0.210) (0.274) (0.274) 
Size  0.046* 0.042 0.017 0.015 
  (0.026) (0.026) (0.029) (0.029) 
Constant  -1.193*** -1.182*** -0.860 -0.843 
  (0.330) (0.330) (0.542) (0.537) 
      
Observations  2,022 2,022 692 692 
Pseudo R-squared  0.0854 0.0903 0.119 0.117 
SE clustered by  Firm Firm Firm Firm 
Year FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Quarter FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: Columns (1) and (2) report the results from estimating Eq. (1a) and (1b) in the subsample of firms for which 
the majority (>50%) of exclusions are nonrecurring. Columns (3) and (4) report the results from estimating Eq. (1a) 
and (1b) in the subsample of firms for which the majority of exclusions are recurring. In columns (1) and (3), GAAP 
ETR is used to proxy for non-discretionary non-GAAP tax rate. In columns (2) and (4), the statutory tax date is used 
to proxy for non-discretionary non-GAAP tax rate. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * 
indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Detailed variable definitions can be found in 
Appendix C. 
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Table 9 Non-GAAP tax rates and earnings persistence  
 
EARNit+4 = 0 + 1NG_EARNit + it+4 (2a) 
EARNit+4 = 0 + γ1NG_EARNETRit + γ2∆NG_EARNETRit + it+4 (2b) 
EARNit+4 = 0 + γ1NG_EARNSTRit + γ2∆NG_EARNSTRit + it+4 (2c) 
 
 Pred. 
Signs 
(1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES EARNit+4 EARNit+4 EARNit+4 
     
NG_EARN (1) + 0.531***   
  (0.054)   
NG_EARNETR (γ1) +  0.563***  
   (0.052)  
∆NG_EARNETR ?  -0.261  
   (0.166)  
NG_EARNSTR (γ1) +   0.583*** 
    (0.050) 
∆NG_EARNSTR ?   -0.346** 
    (0.165) 
Constant  0.531***   
  (0.054)   
     
Compare 1 with γ1 (p-value)   0.064 0.061 
Compare to Column (1): 
Vuong Z-statistic (p-value) 
  
-2.94 (0.003) -2.83(0.005) 
     
Observations  2,592 2,592 2,592 
R-squared  0.265 0.290 0.292 
SE clustered by  Firm Firm Firm 
Year FE  Yes Yes Yes 
Quarter FE  Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: This table reports the results from estimating Eq. (2a) through (2c). Column 1 reports the results from 
estimating Eq. (2a), where NG_EARNit represents the current period non-GAAP earnings firms report. Column 2 
reports the results from estimating Eq. (2b). Column 3 reports the results from estimating Eq. (2c). Robust standard 
errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
Detailed variable definitions can be found in Appendix C. 
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Table 10 Robustness checks  
 
Panel A: Use annual and current quarter GAAP ETR to proxy for the non-discretionary 
non-GAAP tax rate 
 
 
Pred. Signs 
(1) (2) 
VARIABLES Y = MBE Y = MBE 
    
∆NG_EARNANNETR  + 0.482***  
  (0.151)  
∆NG_EARNQTRETR +  0.331** 
   (0.148) 
Total_ADJ + 0.308*** 0.325*** 
  (0.041) (0.043) 
BTM  0.730*** 0.680*** 
  (0.135) (0.134) 
ROA  0.307*** 0.279*** 
  (0.043) (0.043) 
SalesGrowth  0.635*** 0.707*** 
  (0.191) (0.176) 
Size  0.031 0.025 
  (0.022) (0.022) 
Constant  -1.089*** -1.060*** 
  (0.293) (0.297) 
    
Observations  2,489 2,504 
Pseudo R-squared   0.0891 0.0852 
SE clustered by  Firm Firm 
Year FE  Yes Yes 
Quarter FE  Yes Yes 
Notes: This table reports the results from estimating Eq. (1a) and (1b). In columns 1 (2), annual (current quarter) 
GAAP ETR is used to proxy for the non-discretionary non-GAAP tax rate. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Detailed variable definitions can be 
found in Appendix C. 
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Table 10 Robustness checks (continued) 
  
Panel B: Exclude Type II firms with discrete tax items 
 
 
Pred. Signs 
(1) (2) 
VARIABLES Y = MBE Y = MBE 
    
∆NG_EARNETR  + 0.386***  
  (0.130)  
∆NG_EARNSTR +  0.639*** 
   (0.162) 
Total_ADJ + 0.282*** 0.258*** 
  (0.036) (0.037) 
BTM  0.621*** 0.617*** 
  (0.130) (0.129) 
ROA  0.302*** 0.301*** 
  (0.044) (0.044) 
SalesGrowth  0.783*** 0.782*** 
  (0.196) (0.199) 
Size  0.044** 0.043** 
  (0.021) (0.021) 
Constant  -1.170*** -1.172*** 
  (0.286) (0.286) 
    
Observations  2,253 2,253 
Pseudo R-squared  0.090 0.093 
SE clustered by  Firm Firm 
Year FE  Yes Yes 
Quarter FE  Yes Yes 
Notes: This table reports the results from estimating Eq. (1a) and (1b) after dropping Type II observations with discrete 
tax items. We identify the existence of discrete tax items following Bratten et al. (2017). Standard errors are reported 
in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Detailed variable 
definitions can be found in Appendix C. 
 
 
